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Abstract 
 
In an observational learning environment rational agents may mimic the actions of the predecessors 
even when their own signal suggests the opposite. In case early movers’ signals happen to be 
incorrect society may settle on a common inefficient action, resulting in an inefficient informational 
cascade. This paper models observational learning in continuous time with endogenous timing of 
moves. This permits the analysis of comparative statics results. The effect of an increase in signal 
quality on the likelihood of an inefficient cascade is shown to be nonmonotonic.  If agents do not 
have strong priors, an increase in signal quality may lead to a higher probability of inefficient 
herding. The analysis also suggests that markets with quick response to investment decisions, such 
as financial markets, may be more prone to inefficient collapses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Individuals with limited information often observe other people’s actions before making their own 
decisions. The predecessors’ actions tend to contain information about their private signals 
concerning the state of nature. In this social learning process the individual aggregates his own 
private signal with information collected from his observations of others’ actions. This process may 
lead to herd behavior where the agent follows the crowd even when his private information suggests 
the opposite.1 In case early movers’ signals happen to be incorrect, agents may settle on a common 
inefficient action, resulting in an inefficient informational cascade. Gale (1996), Chamley (2004) 
and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) give extensive lists of empirical phenomena that 
herding behavior may explain in both financial and real markets. Examples include balance-of- 
payments crises, R&D investment decisions, analysts’ recommendation of stocks, bank runs and 
managers decisions to pay dividends.2 It is often argued that conformist behavior in financial and 
real markets may lead to sudden booms and crashes. 
In seminal herding papers by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) 
and Welch (1992) there is an exogenously determined sequence in the moves. Chamley and Gale (1994) 
extend the literature to allow for endogenous timing of moves. Each agent has an incentive to wait in 
order to observe the actions of other players. However if everyone were to wait, the agent would rather 
move early in order to avoid costs of delay. Hence the timing decision is strategic. Chamley and Gale 
prove the existence of herd behavior with endogenous timing and characterize the equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
1An informational cascade implies herding behavior. See Smith and Sørensen (2000) for the 
distinction. 
 
2There are a wide variety of markets where herding may arise. For instance, see Scharfstein 
and Stein(1990), Welch(1992), Devenow and Welch (1996), Avery and Zemsky(1998), Welch 
(2000), Chari and Kehoe (2003), Chamley (2003) for analysis of herd behavior in financial markets, 
Neeman and Orosel (1999) for analysis in auctions, Morton and Williams (1999) for herding in a 
political economy framework and Bose, Orosel and Vesterlund (2002), Choi, Dassiou and Gettings 
(2000), Kennedy (2002) and Levin and Peck (2005) for herding among firms. 
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There is a vast literature that examines the conditions under which informational cascades occur 
and analyzes the speed of cascade formation and the fragility of cascades.3 There are however no studies 
that focus on the factors that affect the likelihood of erroneous mass behaviour. This paper studies the 
factors that influence the likelihood of inefficient cascades, either when there is an investment boom 
even though the true value of the project is low (an inefficient positive cascade), or when there is an 
investment collapse even though the true value is high (an inefficient negative cascade). The question 
the paper analyzes is not whether or not there will be cascade formation but the likelihood that the 
cascade outcome is inefficient. 
Chamley and Gale offer an ex-ante welfare analysis on the inefficiency induced by delay and 
observational learning. The additional advantage of analyzing the likelihood of inefficient cascades 
arises when there are externalities from the market to society at large. The ex-ante welfare approach 
includes the expected discounted payoffs of the players directly involved in the game. However, bank 
panics, capital flight and stock market crashes have external consequences which may induce a social 
planner to place a greater weight on inefficient negative cascades than an individual investor. In other 
markets the party designing the structure of the market may not have an incentive to weigh all market 
participants equally. In the IPO market, for example, the features of the market are not controlled by 
a central planner, but rather by the firms offering companies for public sale. These companies may try 
to increase the probability of a positive cascade. Results on the probabilities of inefficient outcomes are 
a potentially useful building block for welfare and policy analysis in markets with such external effects. 
The analysis of factors that influence the likelihood of inefficient herding – the discount rate, 
the signal quality, the prior, the expected value of the investment project – may be important for 
manipulating the outcome of the social learning game. For instance, the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were formed in hopes of preventing catastrophic crashes like Black 
 
 
 
 
3See Chamley (2004) for a review of theoretical advances in the study of informational 
cascades. 
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Thursday in 1929.4 We would like to be able to analyse the implications of an improvement in 
accounting standards (signal quality) on the probability of an inefficient collapse. Likewise, we would 
like to know the effect of an improvement in trading technology on the probability of an inefficient 
outcome. This paper is the first to focus on comparative statics results for all key variables in an 
endogenous-timing framework.5  Other than the directional effects of the factors that influence the 
probability of inefficient herding, the magnitude of the effect may be of importance as well. For 
instance, in an IPO decision reducing the price decreases the probability of collapse where the IPO fails. 
But we would like to know what the optimal price would be. 
We find that the probability of an inefficient negative cascade goes up as agents get more 
patient.6 Agents with a low rate of time preference are more inclined to wait to collect more information 
about the true value of the project. This conservative attitude makes inefficient negative cascades more 
likely. In the leading herding model of  Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992),  inefficient 
negative and positive cascade probabilities go down as signal quality goes up, since early movers are 
more likely to take the correct action. We find that this not the case in general. While an increase in 
signal quality does unambiguously improve the expected utility of buyers in the market, if agents do 
not have strong priors an increase in the signal quality may lead to a higher probability of inefficient 
herding. 
Our paper adapts the Chamley and Gale (1994) endogenous-timing information-revelation 
 
model of investment. The equilibrium is in the same spirit as in Chamley and Gale. However our agents 
 
 
 
4Among other regulations, the act requires that investors receive financial and other 
significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale. 
 
5In our paper, in equilibrium agents follow a critical mass. In Zhang’s (1997) model with 
heterogenous signal quality, all imitate the one leader with the most precise signal. The probability 
of an inefficient cascade is then just equal to the probability of the most precise signal being 
incorrect. 
 
6Chamley and Gale show that at *=1 only negative cascades will be inefficient. This paper 
extends their result to comparative statics over the full range of *. 
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observe others’ actions in continuos time. The learning process can be approximated by a series of 
Brownian Motions and the familiar boundary crossing probabilities are employed to find the 
probabilities of inefficient positive and negative cascades. The merit of a continuous-time framework 
is that it enables us to approximate a closed-form solution to the probability of inefficient cascades. The 
cost is a number of ad-hoc assumptions on the market that will allow the model to be technically 
tractable. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Overview 
 
In the Chamley-Gale model the higher the value of the project the more people there are with an option 
to invest. The project value and number of people with an option are unknown to the agents. Each agent 
with an investment option faces a tradeoff between investing and waiting. If the agent invests he 
collects the undiscounted payoff, but faces the risk of making a loss in case the true value of the project 
is low. If the agent waits he collects only the discounted payoff, but he can learn from others’ actions. 
In equilibrium the agent is just indifferent and randomizes between waiting and investing. Therefore, 
the rate of investment each period is stochastic. The agent tries to deduce from the rate of investment 
each period the number of people with an option and hence the value of the project. If the expected 
value of the project turns negative the agent strictly prefers to wait, as does everyone else, and so the 
game ends with an investment collapse. If the expected value of the project becomes so high that agents 
strictly prefer to invest, the game ends with a sudden investment boom. Since the learning process is 
stochastic, the outcome may be inefficient. Even when the true value of the project is high (low), there 
might be an investment collapse (boom). 
Here we adapt a special case of the model in which there are only two possible values of the 
project allowing agents’ beliefs to be summarized in a single variable, the probability that the project 
value is high. It will be shown that a monotonic transformation of the subjective probability yields a 
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learning process characterized by a simple Lévy process: wt =wt-1-a+bkt where wt denotes the 
transformed subjective probability and kt is the stochastic number of buyers observed in the period and 
it is given by the Poisson approximation to the binomial distribution. The problem is to determine the 
probability that wt crosses the upper bound (where the agent strictly prefers to invest) before the lower 
bound (where the agent strictly prefers to wait) resulting in an investment boom and the probability that 
wt  crosses the lower bound before the upper bound, resulting in an investment collapse. This is a 
mathematical problem that arises in a number of contexts from psychology to queuing theory and hence 
 
has been extensively studied. Nevertheless, despite its seeming simplicity no closed-form solution has 
been found. Hence we depart from the Chamley and Gale framework and move to a continuous-time 
learning setting. 
For the continuous-time adaptation, we make some institutional restrictions on the market to 
make the model technically tractable. We have an agency which takes state-contingent orders in 
discrete time and processes them in continuos time. Agents are allowed to make their invest and wait 
orders (placed in discrete time) contingent on the continuously evolving flow of order processing. The 
payoffs are received at the end of the period. If the expected level of investment were constant in all 
periods this would result in a continuous-time process for the transformed beliefs that is identical to 
the evolution of queue lengths in a standard M/D/1 queue. The standard approximation for this is 
Brownian motion. Our learning process is then a series of one-period Brownian motions. 
For tractability it is also assumed that the processing agency has a capacity limit to the number 
of contingent orders it can accommodate. The capacity limit helps us keep the same basic incentives 
as in Chamley and Gale while ensuring that information transmission stops as soon as one of the 
boundaries is hit. Hence we can make use of the boundary crossing probabilities for Brownian Motion 
to find the probability of an inefficient informational cascade. 
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3. Framework 
The true value of the investment project is denoted by V0{VH VL} where VH>O and VL<O V=VH with 
prior probability q*0(0,1). The number of rational players rN is unboundedly large, r64.7  Players are 
risk neutral. They are ex-ante identical. However, only rn of them receive an investment option. 
Options are identical and indivisible. If the true value of the project is high, there are more agents with 
an investment option: 
 
 
♣♠nH  w  en V = V H n = ♦  L L (1) ♠♥n   w en V = V 
 
Denote ψ ≡ n 
 
< I  R is a measure for signal quality. The further apart nL  and nH, the more 
n H 
information the agent has about the true value of the project from the fact that he has observed the 
investment option in the first place. If nL were equal to nH, the agent who receives the investment option 
would not update his prior. The agent will update his prior belief more heavily as R goes down.8 
Each agent with  an investment option can give an invest order at any date T=0,1,2,... of his 
choice. Payoffs from the exercised options are received at the end of the time period. * 0(0,1) is the 
common discount factor. Investment is irreversible. If the player never invests, the payoff is 0. 
Whether or not the player has an option is private information. Only if the option is exercised is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7This paper adapts the r-fold replica game of Chamley and Gale (1994), Section 6. 
 
8In order to compare this signal quality measure to the signal quality measure in 
Banerjee(1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), suppose that each of the rN 
potential investors receive a signal about the value of the project. The signal is correct with 
probability p>0.5. If V=VH  then prN=rnH  get a positive signal. If V=VL then (1-p)rN=rnL get the 
positive signal. Thenψ = (1 − p) / p . One could easily formulate the problem in this way and the 
equilibrium would mirror that found here, with the agents who received a negative signal simply 
waiting to observe a positive cascade and then investing if and only if the true value is revealed to 
be VH. Here we keep the Chamley and Gale structure in order to facilitate direct comparison. 
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information revealed.9 Each player with an option chooses to either invest now or delay. When making 
their decisions, players can observe the history of other players’ investments. 
Here the value of the project is either high or low and there is a one-to-one mapping between 
V and n. The restriction to only two possible project values will allow us to summarize agents’ beliefs 
at time t about the true state of nature via the probability that the project value is high, denoted by qt. 
This mapping will prove to be very convenient in eventually formulating the learning process in a 
 
linear fashion. 
 
 
 
 
3 I Tradin  Tec nolo Y 
 
Agents place discrete-time state-contingent orders which get processed in continuous time. Orders are 
placed at the beginning of each period. They are processed randomly during the period. The exact time 
that an individual order is processed is distributed uniformly in the period. Payoffs on all orders 
processed in a period are received at the end of the period. Since information on others’ actions will 
be arriving during the period, learning is continuous. Players are permitted to make their orders (both 
invest and wait orders) contingent on the flow of information. Each invest order comes with a state- 
contingent wait order. Investment cannot be reversed in case the invest order is already processed. 
Likewise each wait order comes with a state-contingent invest order. 
We will eventually approximate the agents’ learning process as a series of one-period 
Brownian Motions with absorbing boundaries. We can make use of the familiar boundary crossing 
probabilities only if the equilibrium is such that learning stops the first time the learning process hits 
either of the bounds. We introduce a limit on the capacity of the agency to process contingent orders 
so that the information flow ceases as soon as one of the boundaries are hit. During the interval 
[T T+I)  if the state-contingent wait order is triggered then at most M invest orders are canceled. M is 
 
 
 
 
9See Gossner and Melissas (2006) for a framework with cheap talk among agents. 
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a very large but finite number. During the interval [T,T+1), if the state of the state-contingent invest 
order is triggered, then at most M-6 of the newly triggered invest orders are processed randomly during 
the remainder of the period where 6 is the number of invest orders placed at the beginning of the 
period.10 After the description of the equilibrium strategies, the advantage of allowing for state- 
contingent orders and limiting the maximum capacity of the processing agency will become clear. It 
is discussed at the end of section 4.3. 
 
 
 
3 2  CopYcat Traders 
The quality of the analytic approximation to the cascade probabilities will be improved if we will also 
include copycat traders. There are K=NrnH people who are randomly assigned to this market and they 
simply imitate the probability of investment of rational traders with an investment option. The copycats 
are not needed for the equilibrium of model derived here. However it will be shown that the K people 
add noise to the information to be collected from the market. So they make it harder for the market 
participants to deduce the true value of the project from the observed purchases – resulting in a higher 
expected number of invest orders per period. In equilibrium, this will not alter the amount of 
information transmitted by observational learning, but it leads to a larger number of buyers required 
in equilibrium to transmit the same amount of information (to be discussed in Section 5.2). The larger 
the expected number of invest orders the better is the approximation, hence the existence of copycats 
improves the quality of the approximation to Brownian Motion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10The capacity to accommodate state-contingent wait orders M does not need to be the same 
M as in the capacity to accommodate state-contingent invest orders M-6. They just need to be very 
large finite numbers. One could make the limit on contingencies dependent on how busy the agency 
will be in the remainder of the period: A limit of M)t where )t is the amount of time remaining in 
the period. This would necessitate keeping track of more notation but would not change the results. 
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4. Equilibrium 
 
The focus is restricted to symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Before describing the equilibrium 
strategies, let us first introduce some critical values. 
 
 
 
4 I Critical Values 
Since orders are processed in continuous time, qt evolves in continuous time. The index of time for 
discrete-time decision nodes is denoted by T.  While t 0 ú+    the index T 0ù  So, at time nodes when 
t=T, qt=qT   Bayes’ rule is assumed to describe the agents’ method of updating the probabilities. At the 
beginning of the game, the probability that the project has a high value qT=0, conditional on having 
received an investment opportunity, is given by: 
 
rnH q*  
  rN   qO  = rnH 
 
rnL q * +  I - q*) 
(2) 
rN rN 
 
Since ψ ≡ n 
n H 
 
, (2) can be rewritten as, 
 
 
 
qO  = 
q*  
q* +ψ I - q*) 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
The game is of interest if initially the expected value of the project is positive: 
 
q V H  +  I - q  )V L  > O (4) 
 
 
 
Otherwise each agent would strictly prefer to wait and the game would end immediately with an 
investment collapse. 
It will be useful to introduce two critical values for the subjective probability. Define q_ as the 
probability where the expected value of the project is zero: 
q   V
H + I- q   ) V
L =O  (5) 
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If qt falls below q the agent strictly prefers to wait since the expected value of investment is negative. 
Since everyone who has not yet invested is identical they all prefer to wait and investment stops for 
good. 
Define q as the probability where the agent is just indifferent between investing now and 
 
waiting when information about the true value of the project is to be fully revealed with certainty next 
 
period:   
 
q VH + I- q ) VL = * q VH (6) 
 
If qt rises above q the agent will strictly prefer to invest now. And so will all the identical players and 
the game ends with an investment boom where all players with an option invest. The game will be said 
to be active when q< qt <q 
 
 
4 2  Endo enous Information Revelation and Learnin 
 
Let 8T denote the probability that a player who has not yet exercised his option puts in an invest order 
at the decision node T. In the active phase of the game, it must be that 0<8 T<1. Assume for a moment 
that an agent expects all people with an investment opportunity to invest this period. Then he would 
strictly prefer to wait to be able to learn the value of the project for sure. But so would everyone else. 
Hence 8T…1.  Let us now consider the case where nobody invests this period, 8T=0. If nobody is 
expected to ever invest then no information will be revealed in the future so an individual would strictly 
prefer to invest since q< qt, a contradiction. If investment will resume sometime in the future then an 
individual contemplating being the first future investor would strictly prefer to invest now rather than 
wait since then he would have the same expected value of the game as in this period, but discounted. 
Hence he would strictly prefer to invest now, so 8T…0, by contradiction. Hence in the active phase of 
the game, there can be no pure-strategy equilibrium, 0<8T<1. Players are just indifferent between 
waiting and investing now. 
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Notice that 8T is the endogenous rate of information flow. If 8T were zero, no information would 
be revealed. If 8T were equal to one, the number of people who invest would fully reveal information 
about the value of the project. 
In equilibrium, the history of the game will affect players’ strategies only through the subjective 
probability qt and therefore 8T=8 qT) While players’ actions depend on the publicly observed history 
of the game, history could be payoff relevant for two reasons: i) It influences players’ beliefs about the 
probability that the project has a high value, ii) As more and more people invest, the number of 
potential investors with unexercised options goes down and hence history could potentially alter the 
future flow of information. However the second argument cannot apply in equilibrium. Notice that the 
 
expected number of invest orders, either 8 (R+N)rnH when V=VL or 8 (1+N)rnH when V=VH , must be 
 
finite. If it were infinite, the observation of the rate of investment in one period would reveal the true 
value of n, and hence V by the law of large numbers. In such a case all players would strictly prefer to 
wait, implying 8T=0, a contradiction. As r64, the population of potential investors is very large so 
players are essentially sampling with replacement. For any finite number of exercised options there is 
 
still an infinitely large number of potential investors. Hence the history of the game is payoff relevant 
only because it influences the agents’ belief that the project has a high value. In order to save on 
notation, we will denote 8 qT) as 8T. 
Since agents randomize with 0<8T<1, the level of investment each period is stochastic. As r64, 
 
the number of people putting in invest orders at a decision node is given by the Poisson approximation 
 
to the binomial distribution. The parameter of the Poisson distribution is (rn8  +N8  rnH ), the mean 
 
number of invest orders by the investors 8Trn  plus the expected number of invest orders by the 
 
copycats N8 rnH . During the period these investors’ orders will be processed randomly. Assuming no 
 
contingencies are triggered, the time between completed orders has the exponential distribution and 
 
the number of orders processed in any time interval )t0(0,1) is distributed Poisson with parameter 
 
(rn8 +N8  rnH ))t. The possibility of contingencies being triggered is discussed in Section 4.3. 
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Take any x0[0,1) and any )t0(0,1-x). When V=VH, the probability that k players’ investments 
 
are processed during the time )t given 8T is denoted by f k;8T   )t): 
 
 
♣ e- I+φ )λT rn ∆t  [ I+ φ)λ  rn H ∆t ] k 
H ♠   T   for k ∈ Z ∩ [O   I + φ )rn H ] f k; λ T , ∆t ) = ♦ 
♠ ♥ O 
k! 
elsewhere 
(7) 
 
and the p.d.f. is denoted by f L  k;8 )t) when V=VL: 
 
 
 
 
♣ e-  ψ+φ )λT rn
H ∆t   [ 
L ♠ 
ψ + φ)λT rn 
H ∆t ] k  H 
for k ∈ Z ∩ [0, (ψ + φ) rn   ] 
f k; λ T , ∆t ) = ♦ 
♠ ♥ O 
k! 
elsewhere 
(8) 
 
 
 
 
If nL were equal to nH, then R=1 and the two probability density functions would collapse together. In 
such an extreme case the quality of the information k contains would be nil and the observation of the 
rate of investment would not reveal any information. 
The agent tries to deduce from the number of people who invest in each period which 
distribution the observation comes from. Define k)t as the number of invest orders processed during the 
time )t. Bayesian learning implies that at time T+x+)t, when the agent observes k)t people investing, 
the subjective probability will evolve following: 
 
q f H k  ; λ ∆t) q =   T +x  ∆t  T   (9) T + x+∆t q f H k  ;λ ∆t) + I - q )f L   k  ;λ ∆t) T + x ∆t T T + x ∆t T 
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4 3  Equilibrium Strate ies 
_ 
Let us first assume that the institutional environment restricts the agents to only use q_ and q as their 
 
triggers for the contingent orders. In Appendix B, this assumption is relaxed. The equilibrium of the 
 
game with any finite set of possible trigger points which contains q and q is shown to yield the same 
 
cascade probabilities as this baseline model. 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSITION  1:  T  e  followin    equilibrium  strate ies  support  a  SYmmetric Perfect  BaYesian 
Equilibrium  
a) If t  e subbective probabilitY is sufficientlY low qT#q  put in a wait order wit   a state- 
contin ent invest order If in t e time interval [T T+I)  qt $q t e state-contin ent invest order 
is tri   ered 
b) If t  e subbective probabilitY is sufficientlY   i     qT$q  put in an invest order wit   a state- 
contin ent wait order If in t e time interval [T T+I)  qt#q  t e state-contin ent wait order is 
tri   ered 
c) If t  e subbective probabilitY is q<qT<q   wit   probabilitY 8T   put in an invest order wit   a 
state-contin ent wait order If in t e time interval [T T+I)  qt#q t e state-contin ent wait order 
is tri   ered Wit  probabilitY I-8T  ) put in a wait order wit  a state-contin ent invest order 
If in t e time interval [T T+I)  qt$q t e state-contin ent invest order is tri   ered 
 
 
PROOF: a) By equation (5), when the subjective probability is q_, the expected value of the project is just 
equal to zero. All agents prefer to wait when qT #q. Hence the state qT #q is absorbing. Investment stops 
for good. Information transmission terminates. There is no possible deviation from the equilibrium 
strategy that would make the agent better off. Off the equilibrium path, if in the time interval [T,T+1) 
_ 
new information arriving leads to an updated belief qt$q, the agent prefers to invest and the state- 
contingent invest order is triggered. Since r64, and only M-6 invest orders can be processed, the 
probability of an individual agent’s state-contingent invest order being processed is zero. 
_ 
b) When qT$q, by equation (6) the agent strictly prefers to invest now even if this period the true 
_ 
value of the project is to be revealed for sure. When qT$q, all with an option give invest orders. Since 
 
r64, during the time interval [T,T+1) the true value of n and hence V is revealed at once. If V=VH the 
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_ 
subjective probability would remain above q . If V=VL, the subjective probability would drop below 
 
q_. All agents’ state contingent wait orders would be triggered at once but only M of them would be able 
_ 
to stop investment.11 The game would end with all investing except of those lucky M . Therefore, q $q 
 
is an absorbing state as well. 
_ 
When qT$q, an individual agent could consider the following deviation from the equilibrium 
strategy: Giving a wait order with a state contingent invest order. If all follow the above described 
equilibrium strategy, information about the true value of the project would be revealed at once, and the 
agent’s state contingent invest order would be triggered at once. However his order would be not served 
in the period, since at most M-6 of the newly triggered orders are processed during the period. In 
_ 
equilibrium, when qT$q all give invest orders, since r64 so does 6. Hence the probability of a newly 
 
triggered invest order being processed is goes to zero. Therefore a deviation would lead to one period 
of discounting. By equation (6) the agent would strictly prefer to follow the equilibrium strategy. 
 
 
c) If the subjective probability is q<qT<q , the expected value from investment is positive but 
the agent will also consider waiting in order to learn about the true value of the project. In equilibrium, 
the agent is just indifferent between investing now and waiting. See the beginning of Section 4.2 for 
the discussion of the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibrium. 
i) The agent with an investment option who has not yet exercised his option will put an invest 
order at time T with probability 8T     If in the time interval [T T+I)  qt falls below q, the agent 
would prefer to wait by equation (5). All unprocessed invest orders would convert into wait 
orders. Since M is a very large number, investment would stop for good. 
ii) The agent with an investment option who has not yet exercised her option will put a wait 
order at time T with probability (1-8T). If however in the time interval [T T+I)  qt rises above 
 
 
11Because M is a large but finite number, the probability of an individual agent’s state- 
contingent wait order being processed is zero. 
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q the agent would prefer to invest. M is very large but finite. M-6 newly arrived invest orders 
would be processed this period. All the rest would be processed next period. At time T, the 
agent realizes that there is an infinitely small probability that his invest order would be 
processed if the state is triggered. 
~ 
 
At this point the advantage of allowing for contingent orders should be clear: In the active phase 
_ 
of the game, the subjective probability evolves in continuous time within the bounds q_ and q. Because 
 
we let potential investors put in contingent orders, the game stops the first time q t hits either of the 
bounds. Once either of the bounds is hit, information transmission stops. Without contingencies, within 
the time interval [T,T+1), the subjective probability could potentially cross one the bounds and then 
bounce back depending on the flow of the invest order processing since the exact timing of the 
processing of the individual order is a random variable. In the active phase of the game, if the process 
hits q all state-contingent invest orders are triggered. 
If the processing agency did not have a capacity constraint, the true value of the project would 
be revealed at once and potentially the subjective probability could drop below q_. However the agency 
can process only M-6 newly triggered invest orders. So, no matter whether the true n is nH or nL the 
same number of invest orders will be processed. Therefore in the remainder of the period, the agent 
cannot gain further information about the true value of the project. Information flow stops the moment 
the subjective probability hits the upper bound. If the process hits q_, state-contingent wait orders are 
triggered and they get served since M is a very large number. Therefore information flow would stop. 
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5. Information Cascades 
 
Agents’ beliefs about the true value of the project evolve as a result of observational learning. If the 
_ 
subjective probability hits q before q, the game ends with an investment collapse. If the subjective 
probability hits q before q , the game ends with an investment boom. We are particularly interested in 
the probability of inefficient cascades. The measures of interest are then the probability that the process 
_ 
hits q_ before q when V= V
H, and the probability that the process hits q before q when V= VL. The first 
 
is an inefficient negative cascade and the latter is an inefficient positive cascade. 
 
While the paper will discuss both types of inefficient outcomes, notice that only inefficient 
negative cascades would be categorized as inefficient herding. Here agents that receive an investment 
option would invest if learning were not permitted, by (4). Since by definition herding is acting against 
one’s own signal, we can talk about inefficient herding only when the crowd chooses not to invest. 
 
 
 
5 I Transformation 
 
In order to obtain the boundary crossing  probabilities, we need to transform the problem into an 
 
equivalent problem that is tractable. Subjective probabilities evolve following (9), substitute fH(k;8 )t) 
 
and f L(k;8 )t) from (7) and (8) into (9). Cancel out k factorial from the numerator and denominator. 
 
Take the inverse of both the left and right hand side of the equality and subtract one from each side. 
n L 
Now plugging in R for yields, 
n H 
 
I - qt+∆t  = I - qt  e I-ψ)λT rnH ∆t   ψ + φ  
 k∆t  (10) 
qt+∆t qt 
  1 + φ   
 
 
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and multiplying both sides by minus one yields: 
 
 
  I - q     I - q      ψ + φ   -ln t+∆t = -ln t - I - ψ)λ rn H ∆t - k  ln     q       q   T
 ∆t   1 + φ   
 (11) 
  t+∆t     t       
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H 
where kªt  is distributed Poisson with the parameter 8T  I+N)rn )t when the true value of the project is 
 
high and it is distributed Poisson with the parameter 8T  R+N)rn 
 
is low. Define a transformation wt as: 
)t when the true value of the project 
 
 
≡ 
  I - qt    wt -ln     
    qt   
(12) 
Notice that wt is an increasing monotonic transformation of qt     We can rewrite (11) as: 
 
w =  ψ - I)λ  rn H ∆t + w - ln   ψ
 + φ   k
  
(13)
 
 
t+∆t T t   1 + φ    ∆t
 
    
 
 
 
 
The transformed subjective probabilities evolve following (13), where k)t  is investment in )t. 
 
In this model individual learning follows a stochastic process with independent increments. It 
is interesting to note that this process is a well-known description of individual learning in cognitive 
psychology. That literature looks, for example, at how people identify objects looking at pictures. In 
much of the literature individuals are modeled as learning through random sampling. This 
characterization of the learning process is then used to explain laboratory evidence on individual 
response times and error rates. The present paper shows that even with fully rational agents, group 
behavior will resemble the individual behavior of boundedly rational agents of the type used in 
cognitive psychology.12 
The transformation (12) of the lower bound given by (5), of the upper bound given by (6) and 
 
of the starting point given by (3) yield : 
 
The lower bound: q Y w w = ln -V L ) - lnV H 
 
 
 
(14) 
 
 
The upper bound: q Y w w = ln -V L ) - lnV H - ln I - δ) (15) 
 
 
 
 
 
12See Luce (1986) for an introduction to this literature. 
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T T 
The starting point: qO  Y wO wO  = lnq* - ln I - q* ) - lnψ 
 
(16) 
 
 
Since initially the expected value of the project is positive (4), w <wO. And wO  <w examining (6) and 
 
(3) together. 
 
 
 
 
5 2  BoundarY Crossin   Probabilities wit  constant 8 
 
The transformed subjective probabilities follow equation (13) where the error term k)t  is distributed 
 
Poisson with the parameter (rn8  +N8 rnH ))t.  Both the mean and the variance of the process depend 
 
on 8T and hence they depend on the history of the game. They are not constant. 
 
Now we are going to examine a different process. In this modified problem we will examine 
the processes described by equations (13) and (7) and (8) yet with a constant 80(0,1), implying a 
constant Poisson parameter. Section 5.3 will prove that the process with the endogenously-determined 
non-constant 8 will yield identical boundary crossing probabilities as in this modified problem with 
fixed 8. 
With a constant 8, equation (13) implies that wt evolves in the same way as the queue length 
in a standard M/D/1 queue. An M/D/1 queue has exponential arrivals, so the distribution of new 
customers over an interval )t is Poisson, and one server who takes a deterministic amount of time to 
serve a customer. Here we will make use of the standard results for the queue length for heavy-traffic 
 
M/D/1 queues and approximate the evolution of wt as a Brownian Motion 13: 
 
w ≈ w + k* (17) t+∆t t ∆t 
 
 
 
 
13See Kleinrock (1976) for a textbook derivation and Gaver (1968) for the original 
contribution. This is known as the “heavy-traffic diffusion approximation.”A heavy-traffic queue 
is one in which the average arrival rate of customers is close to the capacity of the server. In queuing 
theory this is important for the approximation because otherwise the queue length would have a 
mass point at zero length. This issue does not arise here because the game will effectively end when 
either of the boundaries are hit. Here we have absorbing boundaries rather than the reflective 
boundary of a queue. 
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)t 
k ♦ 2 
2 
  N ∆t 
where k  * is distributed normal with mean :ªt and variance F2ªt: 
 
 
 
♣ H   
♠ J. =   ψ - I -  I + φ )ln 
ψ + φ   H 
  λrn 
H * ♠   1 + φ   w  en V = V k∆ t       N ♦ 
♠ 
 
2     H   σ  )   =  I + φ )   ln 
 
ψ   + φ   
  
 
 
λ rn H 
(18) 
♠♥   1 + φ   
 
 
 
 
♣ L   
♠ J. =   ψ - I -  ψ + φ )ln 
ψ   + φ   H 
  λ rn  , 
w  en V = V L * ♠ 
  
♠ 
1 + φ    
 
  ψ   + φ   
 
(19) 
σ 2    ) L  =  ψ + φ )   ln    λrn 
H 
♠♥   1 + φ   
 
 
 
 
 
 
:H>0 by Claim A1, and :L<0 by Claim A2 in the Appendix. 
It is important to emphasize the limitations of this approximation. It is a good approximation 
for a high expected rate of investment. This will happen with a high N (high numbers of noise traders). 
Keeping the rate of information flow 8 constant, an increase in N leads to a weaker drift. That is the 
positive drift :H declines and the negative drift :L increases. The higher N the less informative a single 
observation is about the true value of the project. Both (F2)H and (F2)L go down with an increase in N, 
keeping 8 constant. Each observation has less informational content, hence beliefs don’t get updated 
as much. Therefore keeping 8 constant, an increase in N would make agents strictly prefer to wait. 
Since in equilibrium agents are just indifferent between investing and waiting, a higher N must be 
 
associated with a higher 8. Moreover as qT → q , λT rn → ∞. Hence for a given )t and qT, there is a 
 
H
 
N that will yield a high enough Poisson parameter (rn8T +N8T rn ))t so that the normal approximation 
 
is reasonable. For any finite N there will be a range qT  ∈ (q, q ] where the approximation is not 
 
reasonable. Notice however that 8 only changes at t ∈ Z , so by increasing N and hence decreasing q we 
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L 
≤ ƒ 
can make the probability of ever encountering qT  ∈ (q, q ] small. Brownian Motion also requires that 
 
the normal approximation holds as )t60. Just as in queuing theory there is no set of parameters where 
this is the case, hence as in queuing theory it will always be an approximation. 
The standard boundary crossing probabilities for Brownian motion yield the following results.14 
 
i) ProbabilitY of  ittin  w before w w en V=VH 
 
 
ϒ -2J.H w
 
-2J. H w
 
-2J.H w -2J. H w    ⁄
 
         O                
Prob   w before w V = V H ) = I- ′  e (σ 2 )H   - e (σ 2 )H     e (σ 2 )H   - e (σ 2 )H   
 ∞ 
(20) 
′       ∞ 
≤       ƒ 
 
    2J. H   w     Multiply the numerator and the denominator of (20) by exp   
  
 
(σ 2 H    
. Plug in Equations (18), (14), 
)   
H 2  H
 
(15) and(16) for w  w wO     : and  F ) : 
 
 
 
 
H 
  I - e ′≤
 
∞ƒ   
 
 
Prob   w before w V = V ) = I-   
2ϕ H ϒ ln I-q*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L )⁄ 
  
H 
 
(21) 
  I - e2ϕ ln I-δ)   
    
 
 
 
 
where ϕH   ≡ 
J. H  
. By Claim A1 in Appendix A, :H  >0. So nH>0. 
σ 2  )H 
 
 
 
ii) ProbabilitY of  ittin  w before w w en V=VL: 
 
 
L L L L
 
     -2J.   w -2J.  wO       -2J.   w  -2J.   w   
Prob  w before w V = V L ) =   e (σ 2 )L   - e (σ 2 )L      /   e (σ 2 )L   - e (σ 2 )L   
  
(22) 
        
        
 
 
Plug in (19), (14), (15), (16) into (22): 
 
 
Prob  w before w V = V L ) = 
I - e
 
2ϕ L ϒ ln I- q*  )-lnq* +lnψ -ln V H  )+ln -V L  )⁄ 
 
I - e2ϕ  ln I-δ) 
 
(23) 
 
 
-21 
 
 
14See for example Karlin and Taylor (1975) for the derivation. 
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where ϕL  ≡ 
J. L  
. By Claim A2 in Appendix A, :L  <0. So nL  <0. 
σ 2  )L 
 
 
 
Before proceeding to the next subsection it is crucial to notice that nH  and nL  are independent 
of 8, from (18) and (19). While an increase in 8 leads to an increase in :, it also leads to an increase 
in F2. And these two effects counterbalance each other in the determination of the boundary crossing 
probabilities. Hence these probabilities are independent of 8. 
 
 
 
5 3   Inefficient Cascade Probabilities for t e Ori  inal Problem 
 
PROPOSITION 2: T e boundarY crossin   probabilities of t e ori inal problem are equal to t e 
boundarY crossin   probabilities found usin   a Brownian Motion   2I)  and   23) of t e modified 
problem 
 
 
 
Proof: 
 
In the actual learning process, the 8 is updated at each decision node. The process is a series of one 
period Brownian Motions. The boundary crossing probabilities for this process can be reconstructed 
iteratively using Lemma B1 in Appendix B. Starting with the Brownian Motion with absorbing 
boundaries defined in  (14) and (15) and the starting point given by (16), create a process where the 
parameter λ changes to λ ′ (which is stochastic) at T=1 and stays constant thereafter. From Lemma B1, 
 
this new process has the same transition probabilities as the original process. Iterating this argument 
yields the result. 
~ 
 
 
 
 
Denote the probability of an inefficient negative cascade by Prob INC) which is equal to the 
_ 
probability that the process hits q_ before q when V= V
H. By Propostion 2, Prob INC) is given by 
 
equation (21). 
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Prob IPC) denotes the probability of an inefficient positive cascade and it is the probability that 
the process hits q before q when V= VL. By Proposition 2, Prob INC) is given by equation (23). 
 
 
 
6. Comparative Statics 
 
6 I T e Prior Expected Value 
When there is potentially a lot to gain (VH8) or little to loose (VL8), much would be lost in expectation 
due to discounting while waiting. So the agent would be more prone to investing before he is certain 
it is a good project (hence q9). And the belief about the odds of the project being a high value project 
does not need to be as high for the agent to strictly prefer to wait (so q_9). Therefore the probability of 
hitting the upper bound before hitting the lower bound increases. The likelihood of an inefficient 
positive cascade goes up and the likelihood of an inefficient negative cascade goes down.15 
As the prior expected value of the project goes up due to an increase in q*, the upper bound q 
and the lower bound q_ are unaffected, by (6) and (5). Being closer to the upper bound to begin with, 
the agents require less evidence in their learning process to strictly prefer investment. Hence they are 
more likely to invest when the prior improves. 
 
 
 
PROPOSITION 3: As t e prior expected value increases q*8or VH8 or VL8) it becomes more likelY t at 
all a  ents wit   an option undertake t  e probect  It becomes less likelY t  at t  ere is an 
investment collapse w  en t  e true value is   i      Prob INC)9  It becomes more likelY t  at t  ere is an 
investment boom w en t e true value is low Prob IPC)8 
 
 
 
Proof: Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 In an exogenous-timing herding framework Welch (1992) shows that as the prior expected 
value from investment goes up, there is a greater chance that society ends up in a positive cascade 
since early movers are more likely to invest. 
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( 2ϕ  ln I-δ) ) dδ 
6 2  Discountin : 
 
Discounting doesn’t play a role in exogenous-timing models. Examination of this issue requires an 
endogenous-timing model. The agent makes a choice between investing now or later. If the agent waits, 
he can learn by observing other people’s actions, however the payoff gets discounted.  All else 
constant, as people get more patient (* 8), they will be more willing to wait. Since waiting induces 
learning, one might be tempted to conclude that higher * would be associated with a smaller probability 
of an erroneous mass behavior. However this is not the case. In fact the probability of an inefficient 
negative cascade goes up. Chamley and Gale (1994) show that for *=1there is a weakness of the 
investment process in the direction of underinvestment. Proposition 4 extends this result to comparative 
statics over the whole range of *. 
 
 
 
PROPOSITION 4: As a  ents become more patient  *8)  it becomes more likelY t at a  ents do not 
undertake t e investment probect It becomes more likelY t  at t  ere is an investment collapse 
Prob INC)8  w  en t  e true value is   i      It becomes less likelY t  at t  ere is an investment boom 
Prob IPC)9 w en t e true value is low 
 
 
 
Proof: 
 
The probability of an inefficient negative cascade goes up as * goes up, 
 
 
dProb INC) 
 
2ϕ H 2ϕ 
H ln I-δ) e 
= (I - Prob INC)) 
dδ I - δ)  I - e 
> O 
2ϕ H ln I-δ) (24) 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the probability of an inefficient positive cascade goes down as * goes up. 
 
 
dProb IPC) 
 
2ϕ L 2ϕ 
Lln I-δ) e 
= - Prob IPC) L < O 
I - δ)  I - e 
(25) ~ 
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An increase in * has a two effects. The first effect is through the rate of information flow 8 
 
As agents get more patient, at the ongoing information flow, they would strictly prefer to wait. So the 
rate of information flow goes down such that people are just indifferent between waiting and 
investing.16 
However this first effect has no influence on the probability of inefficient cascades in this 
framework. When the true value of the project is high V=VH, a weaker information flow implies a 
weaker drift velocity :H  which simply increases the likelihood of a negative cascade. However at the 
same time the weaker information flow decreases the noise (F2)H in the learning process. Each 
observation will have a smaller influence on the updating process. This reduces the likelihood of a 
negative cascade. And these two opposing effects exactly counterbalance each other. 8 cancels out from 
the probability of inefficient cascade (see equations (21) and (23)). The indirect effect through the 
information flow is therefore nullified. The spirit of the story is the same for the case when V=VL. 
The second effect of an increase in * is through the upper bound. A higher * yields a higher 
upper bound q leaving the starting point and the lower bound unchanged. Since investors are more 
patient, they are willing to wait until they are almost certain about the project before they buy. This 
makes an inefficient negative cascade more likely, and an inefficient positive cascade less likely. 
This comparative statics result suggests that financial markets might be more prone to 
inefficient collapses than real markets. Once an investment order is given, the payoff can be collected 
only at the end of the period. Keeping the rate of time preference constant, as the time to process 
investment decisions increases so does the distance between the time periods in the model, leading to 
a lower *. In financial markets, the administrative and technological systems may be faster to react to 
 
 
 
16See Chamley (2004) for a simple two period two agent example. If V=VH, both people have 
an option. If the V=VL, only one agent has an option. In equilibrium, the agent if not invested in the 
first period would invest in the second period only if he observes investment in the first period. 
When * goes up, the equilibrium probability if investment in the first period goes down, making an 
investment collapse more likely even if the true value is high. 
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agents investment decisions than in real markets. Hence in financial markets the relevant * would be 
larger than in real markets leading to a higher likelihood of an inefficient collapse. 
 
 
 
6 3  QualitY of Information: 
 
The leading model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) shows that as signal quality goes 
up, inefficient negative and positive cascade probabilities go down. The effect is monotonic. Here, this 
not the case. An increase in the signal quality does of course unambiguously improve the expected 
value of the game to the market participants.17 But the probabilities of inefficient cascades may go up 
or down depending on the parameter values. Result 1 in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) 
is closely related. It shows that all agents after the second are better off when the first agent’s signal 
quality (expertise) is slightly decreased. This results in more information  for later individuals as it 
decreases the probability that a cascade forms after just two individuals. A related issue arises here 
when the starting belief is close to one of the boundaries. 
To understand the role of signal quality in this framework, first notice that agents who receive 
an investment option would all undertake the investment if there were no social learning. It is through 
social learning that the possibility of an investment collapse arises. The increase in signal quality 
affects the outcome of the game through two channels; i) Self-confidence: It increases the confidence 
of the agent in his own signal. Keeping the level of signal quality of the rest of the people constant, as 
the signal quality of the agent goes up, the agent is more likely to undertake the project, hence 
Prob(INC)9 and Prob(IPC)8. ii) Confidence in observational learnin : It increases the confidence of 
the agent in observational learning since each individual has a high quality signal. Now keeping the 
signal quality of the agent constant, as the signal quality of the rest of the players increases the agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17See equations (3) and (4). 
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H 
L 
L 
H 
becomes more likely not to undertake the project, hence Prob(INC)8 and Prob(IPC)9. These two 
channels with opposing forces can be examined below. 
Let us first examine the probability of an inefficient negative cascade. Equation (20) can  be 
 
rewritten as:   
 
I - e2ϕ 
 
 
 
w- wO ) 
Prob INC) = 1 −  
  
(26) 
I - e2ϕ w -w ) 
 
 
_ 
From (14) and (15) notice that w_ and w are independent of R. So, 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) = 
  ∂ Pr ob( INC ) ∂w0   +   ∂ Pr ob( INC ) ∂ϕ  
  
(27)
 
dψ   ∂w ∂ψ     ∂ϕ H ∂ψ      0       
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first term relates to the first channel; self-confidence. It is the effect of R on the probability of an 
inefficient negative cascade through the agents’s belief before the observational learning starts (w0). 
It is positive by Claim C3 in Appendix C.18 The second term relates to the second channel; confidence 
in observational learning. It is negative by Claim C1 and C4 in Appendix C. Therefore there are two 
forces working in opposite directions. 
Let us now examine the probability of an inefficient positive cascade. Rewrite (22) as, 
 
I - e2ϕ 
Prob IPC) = 
I - e2ϕ 
w- wO ) 
 
w -w ) 
 
(28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18This is consistent with the discussion in the previous paragraph since an increase in R 
represents a deterioration in signal quality. 
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ade mi 
L 
So, 
 
d Pr ob( IPC ) 
= 
  ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) ∂w0    + 
  ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) ∂ϕ  
  
 
(29) 
dψ   ∂w
 
∂ψ    
 
∂ϕ L ∂ψ  
 
  0       
 
 
 
The first term is negative by Claim C5 in Appendix C. It relates to the first channel. The second term 
relates to the second channel. It is positive by Claim C2 and Claim C6 in Appendix C. Hence there are 
two opposing effects. 
 
 
 
PROPOSITION 5: As t e si nal qualitY improves   1 ↑   
 
t e likeli ood of an inefficient positive cascade   ψ   
and t e likeli ood of an inefficient ne ative casc    t  o up or down dependin  on t e parameter 
values 
 
 
 
Proof: Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 5 is proven in two steps. The first step proves that 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
dψ _ 
 
>0, when w06w_ and 
dψ 
<0 when w0 is not to close to either of the bounds, w_<<w0<<w. The second step proves 
d Pr ob( IPC ) _ d Pr ob( IPC ) that <0, when w06w . dψ _ 
> 0 when w0 is not to close to either of the bounds, dψ 
w_<<w0<<w. Depending on the initial belief of the agent with an option, the effect of an increase in 
 
signal quality through confidence in observational learning can dominate the effect through self- 
confidence. If the agent does not have a strong initial belief (such that w0 is not too close to either of 
the bounds) the social learning channel becomes more important in determining the direction of the 
effect of signal quality on the outcome of the game. An increase in signal quality can lead to an increase 
in the probability of inefficient herding. Investment is stochastic by the very nature of the game. Even 
when the true value of the project is high, it is possible to get a few bad draws in a row. In such a case, 
when the signal quality is high, the agent will heavily update his beliefs possibly leading to an 
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investment collapse.19 If however the signal quality were lower, the agent would need to collect more 
evidence before he strictly preferred to wait.20 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Knowledge of the direction and the magnitude of comparative statics results on the probability of a 
collapse is essential in herd manipulation. The pricing decision of a firm introducing a new technology, 
the advertising policy affecting the signal quality may be some of the key elements in manipulating the 
outcome of the social learning game. In financial markets, one of the objectives of regulatory bodies 
may be to reduce the probability of sudden crashes.21 While the tools available to the regulatory body 
for herd manipulation are typically restricted there is some room for relevant regulation. Accounting 
standards affect the signal quality, transaction taxes affect the expected value, the closing and opening 
times as well as the time of delay for payments of the payoffs affect discounting. 
The advantage of analyzing the likelihood of inefficient cascades arises when there are 
externalities from the market to society at large. In these cases looking at the ex-ante utility of the 
players directly involved in the game insufficient for welfare analysis. For example, bank panics, 
capital flight and stock market crashes have external consequences which may induce a social planner 
 
 
 
 
19On the other hand, naturally if signal quality is high, it would be less likely to have bad 
draws when the true value is high. 
 
20As the signal quality goes up, it is more likely that the first movers pick the correct choice 
and the confidence in observational learning increases. But this implies that the agent will be more 
likely to go with the “trustworthy” crowd which is bad news if the early movers happen to have 
picked the incorrect choice. If some agents’ signal quality is unboundedly high then there is no 
chance of this occurring, see Rogers (2005). Also see De Vany and Lee (2001). Nelson (2002) looks 
at a related but different aspect of signal quality. The simulation results indicate that in a changing 
environment, the  frequencY of herding is non-monotone in signal quality. 
 
21Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that herd behavior can lead to a significant short-run 
mispricing of financial assets. See Dremann, Oechssler and Roider (2005) for an experimental 
analysis of Avery and Zemsky (1998). 
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to place a greater weight on inefficient negative cascades than an individual investor. In other markets 
the party designing the structure of the market may not have an incentive to weigh all market 
participants equally. In the IPO market, for example, the features of the market are not controlled by 
a central planner, but rather by the firms offering companies for public sale. These companies may try 
to increase the probability of a positive cascade. Results on the probabilities of inefficient outcomes 
are a potentially useful building block for welfare and policy analysis in markets with such external 
effects. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Appendix A: 
 
Claim A1: J. H  > O w  ere  J. H  =   ψ - I - I+ φ)ln ψ + φ   λrn H  .
 
  1 + φ  
 
    
 
Proof: Define f (ψ ) =   ψ - I -  I + φ )ln ψ + φ   Note t at f I)=O   1 + φ       
 
Since f    ψ)= ψ - I  < O 
ψ + φ 
 
 
Y f R)>O for O<R<I So 
 
µ H  > O  ~ 
 
 
Claim A2: 
 
J. L  < 0 w  ere  J. L =   ψ - I - ψ + φ )ln ψ + φ   λrn H .
 
  1 + φ  
 
    
 
Proof: Define f (ψ ) =   ψ - I -  ψ + φ )ln ψ + φ   Note t at f I)=O   1 + φ       
 
Since 
 
f '(ψ ) = − ln ψ + φ > 0 
1 + φ 
 
Y f R) <O for O<R<I So 
 
µ L < O . ~ 
 
 
Appendix B: 
 
 
Lemma B1: Let wt (λ ) be a Brownian Motion wit  absorbin  boundaries as defined in  I4) and  I5) 
: and F2 as defined in  I1) and  I1) and wit  startin  point wT  ∈ ( w, w) Let w t be anot er process 
wit  t e same form and parameters as wt up to some possiblY stoc astic time τ > T at w ic  time t e 
parameter λ is replaced bY λ ′, w ic maY also be stoc astic  Bot wt (λ ) and w t  Yield t e same 
probabilities of  ittin  t e boundaries  2I) and  23) 
 
 
Proof: Define b(τ , wτ , λ ′) as t e boint p d f of τ , wτ  and λ ′ conditional on not  ittin  eit er boundarY 
in t ≤ τ . Define Pw  ( λ )→ w as t e probabilitY startin  from wT  t at process  its t e boundarY w before 
w. Since wt (λ ) is a standard Brownian Motion Pw  ( λ ) → w is  iven bY 
ϒ   -2J. w
 -2J.wO     
    -2J. w  -2J. w  ⁄ 
P = I - ′  e σ 
 
- e σ   /   e σ 2 - e σ  
∞ 
(30) 
wO  ( λ ) → w                 
 
and P (   ) = 1 − P (   )
 . T  ese depend on 8 onlY t rou t e ratio µ / σ 2 . Hence t e probabilities wt   λ  → w wt   λ  → w 
of wt (λ ) ittin  t e boundaries do not depend on 8   Alt ou t e date τ as no special relevance to 
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0 0 
τ w  λ ′ 
+ ϒ1 − P − P ⁄ P b(τ , w , λ ′) ⋅ dτ ⋅ dw ⋅ d λ ′ 
0 0 
0 0 ƒ 
τ τ 
t is process we can still decomposed t is probabilitY into t e probabilitY t at it transitions before or 
at τ and t e probabilitY it transitions after τ : 
 
 
Pw (λ )→w = Pw (λ )→w t ≤τ 
 
′≤ w0 (λ )→w t ≤τ w0 (λ )→w t ≤τ ∞ƒ ∫ ∫ ∫ wτ (λ )→w τ τ 
τ 
 
(31) 
 
 
 
W  ile we know t e left- and side of t is t e formulas for t e conditional probabilities and p d f s on t  
e ri   t- and side are unknown However since w t  starts off as t e same process we can similarlY 
decompose its probabilitY as 
 
 
Pw  → w  = Pw  ( λ )→ w t ≤τ  
(32) 
+ ϒ  − −
 
⁄ ′ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ′
 
≤1   Pw  ( λ )→ w t ≤τ Pw  ( λ )→ w t ≤τ     ∫ ∫ ∫ Pwτ ( λ ′)→ w b(τ , wτ , λ )  dτ 
τ  wτ  λ ′ 
dwτ    d λ 
 
Here bot   t  e left and ri t- and side probabilities are unknown Nevert eless  since it is t e same 
process up to τ t ese conditional probabilities and p d f s are t e same as in  3I) wit  t e exception 
of t e continuation probabilities in t e inte rals Note  owever t ese are simplY t e probabilities for 
Brownian Motion startin  from wτ  wit  parameter λ ′ and  ence for eac  potential realiliation of wτ 
and λ ′ t e probabilitY can be found from 3O) bY substitutin wτ   for w0 . As before λ ′ cancels out from 
t ese probabilities T  erefore eac Pw  ( λ ′)→ w  in equation  32) is equal to t e correspondin Pw  ( λ )→ w 
in 3I) and  ence P = P . T  e same ar  ument s  ows t at P = P , w ic  completes w0 ( λ )→ w w 0 → w 
t e proof of t e lemma 
w0 ( λ )→ w w 0 → w 
 
 
~ 
 
 
 
 
Proposition B1: T  e equilibrium of t  e   ame wit   anY finite set ' of possible contin encY tri er 
points w ic  contains q and q will Yield t e same transition probabilities as t e baseline model 
 
 
Proof: From t e baseline model w ere Γ = {q  , q } add one contin encY tri er point q′. If q > q or q'< 
q  t en t e state q′ would never be reac ed in t e baseline equilibrium We can construct a parallel 
equilibrium w ere no a  ent c ooses to  ave a contin encY tri ered at q′. Hence t e edition of q′ will 
not c an  e t e transition probabilities 
 
 
If 
π ( qT , t ), 
q′ ∈ ( q, q ) t en  some  a  ents  maY  c  oose  to  set  contin encY  tri ers  t ere Let 
encefort  B be t e probabilitY t at an individual a  ent c ooses to set a contin encY tri  er 
at q′. T  is maY be eit er to buY or to cancel an impendin  order  Note t at π maY depend on t since 
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= 
= 
for a   iven number of impendin  orders t e time remainin   in t  e period will determine t  e rate of 
information flow durin  t e rest of t e period w ic  in tern influences t e expected value of waitin 
T  e same ar  ument used for λ implies t at B<I   If q ′ is a buY tri er and B=I t en eac  individual 
would prefer to wait since 
buY since q′ > q. 
q′ < q . If it is a wait tri er and B=I t en eac  individual would prefer to 
Moreover if t e a  ents are usin q ′ as a buY tri er t en rBnH  must be finite for all 
contin encies w ic maY be it wit non-ne li ible probabilitY If not t  en if t  e contin encY is 
tri ered at anY t<T+I-g  t e true value of n and  ence V would be revealed wit  certaintY bY t e end 
of t e period Since 
certaintY 
q′ < q eac  individual would prefer to wait w en t  e state will be revealed wit 
So eit er t e addition of q ′ as no effect on t e outcome in t e period  B=O) or in equilibrium 
eac  individual will be indifferent between usin  it as a tri er or not and t e number of a  ents wit 
outstandin  buY orders at eac   contin encY tri er point will be drawn from a Poisson distribution 
wit  finite mean So t e addition of t e contin encY will cause 8 to c an  e w en it is tri ered But bY 
Lemma CI t is new process  as t e same transition probabilities as t e ori inal process Iteratin  t e 
ar  ument allows us to add anY finite number of contin encY tri er points to t e set ' wit out alterin 
t e transition probabilities 
~ 
 
 
Appendix C: 
 
 
Claim C1: 
 
 
 
dϕ H 
dψ 
 
 
 
> 0 w ere 
 
 
 
dϕ H 
dψ 
 
 
−2ψ + 2 + (1 +ψ + 2φ ) ln ψ + φ 
1 + φ 
3 
(ψ + φ )(1 + φ )   ln ψ + φ  
 
  1 + φ   
 
 
 
Proof: Define f (ψ ) = −2ψ + 2 + (1 +ψ + 2φ ) ln ψ + φ 
1 + φ 
    
 
 
Note t at f I)=O 
 
And f   ψ)= -2 + 1 +ψ + 2φ + ln ψ + φ 
 
Note t at f '(1) = 0 
ψ + φ 1 + φ  
 
dϕ H 
f ''(ψ ) = ψ − 1   < 0 
(ψ + φ )2 
Hence f '(ψ ) > 0 for O<R<I So f R)<O  so > 0 ~ 
dψ 
 
 
 
Claim C2: 
 
 
dϕ L 
dψ 
 
 
> 0 w ere 
 
 
dϕ L 
dψ 
−2ψ + 2 + (1 +ψ + 2φ ) ln ψ + φ 
1 + φ 
3 
(ψ + φ )2   ln ψ + φ     1 + φ   
 
    
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H 
ƒ ≤ 0    ƒ 
L 
H 
H H H 
H H H 
ƒ 
≤ 
 
Proof: dϕ 
L
 
dψ 
 
and dϕ 
H
 
dψ 
 
ave t e same numerator In Lemma A3  it is s  own t at t e numerator is 
 
 
ne ative Since t e denominator is ne ative as well dϕ 
L 
> 0 ~ 
dψ 
 
 
 
 
Claim C3: T  e first term of  27) is positive ∂ Pr ob( INC ) ∂w0   > 0 
∂w0 ∂ψ 
 
∂ Pr ob( INC ) 2ϕ H e2ϕ ( w− w0 )  ϕ H     w − w    
 
∂w 1 Proof:  
∂w0 
= − H < 0 
1 − e2ϕ   ( w− w ) 
since (1 − e2     ( ) ) > 0 And    0   = − < 0 . ~ 
∂ψ ψ 
 
 
 
 
∂ Pr ob( INC ) ∂ Pr ob( INC ) I - e2ϕ w- wO )  ϒ 2( w − w)e2ϕ w− w ) 2( w − w )e2ϕ w− w0 ) ⁄ Claim C4: < 0  w  ere = − −   0   
∂ϕ H ∂ϕ H 
 
I - e2ϕ w− w )   
′ 
′≤ 
 
1 − e2ϕ 
 
w− w ) 1 − e2ϕ w− w0 ) ∞
∞
 
 
Proof: T  e term inside t e brackets is positive Examine t e properties of t e followin  function 
 
2ϕ H    w− x )
 
Let ( x ) = 2(w − x)e 
1 − e2ϕ 
 
w− x ) 
w ere x>w  T  en notice t at t e term inside t e brackets is equal to 
 
 
ϒ   ( w) − 
 
 
( w0 ) ⁄ 
 
If  d 
 
( x) 
> 0 
dx 
 
t en ϒ 
 
 
( w) − 
 
( w ) ⁄ > 0 and 
 
∂ Pr ob( INC ) 
< 0 
∂ϕ H 
 
d  ( x) 
= 
2e2ϕ 
H ( w  − x ) 
H (e2ϕ H ( w− x ) − 1 − 2ϕ H ( w − x) ) dx (1 − e2ϕ ( w− x ) )2 
 
Let li = 2ϕ H ( w − x ) w ere li<O for x0 wO   w) 
 
T  e term in t e parent esis is t en equal 
 
f ( li ) = e li   − 1 − li 
 
f li=O)=O  And 
 
f '( li ) = e li   − 1 < 0 for all li<O  Hence 
 
d  ( x) 
> 0 
dx 
 
T  erefore ∂ Pr ob( INC ) < 0 ~ 
∂ϕ H 
 
 
 
 
Claim C5: T  e first term of  21) is ne ative ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) ∂w0  < 0 . 
∂w0  ∂ψ 
 
 
Proof: ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) = 2ϕ 
L e2ϕ 
L ( w− w0 ) 
2ϕ L ( w− w )
 
 
> 0 since nL<O and (1 − e2ϕ  ( w − w ) ) < 0 
 
And 
 
∂w0   = − 1 < 
 
0 . ~ 
∂w0 1 − e ∂ψ ψ 
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L 
L L L 
L L 
ƒ 
If 
 
∂ Pr ob( IPC ) 
 
∂ Pr ob( IPC ) 
 
I - e2ϕ w- wO )  ϒ 2( w − w)e2ϕ 
 
w− w ) 
 
2( w − w )e2ϕ w− w0 ) ⁄ Claim C6: > 0 w  ere = −   0   
∂ϕ L ∂ϕ L 
 
I - e2ϕ w− w )   
′ 
′≤ 
 
1 − e2ϕ 
L    w     − w ) 
 
1 − e2ϕ w − w0 ) ∞
∞
 
 
 
Proof: T  e term inside t e brackets is positive Examine t e properties of t e followin  function 
 
2ϕ L     w− x )
 
Let 2( w − x)e ( x ) = L 
1 − e2ϕ 
 
w− x ) 
w ere x>w t  en notice t  at t  e term inside t  e brackets is equal to 
 
ϒ  ( w) − ( w0 ) ⁄
 d   ( x )    
> 0
 
 
t en ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) 
L > 0  since w >wO
 
≤ ƒ dx ∂ϕ 
 
d  ( x) 
= 
dx 
2e2ϕ 
L ( w  − x ) 
(1 − e2ϕ  ( w − x ) )2 
(e2ϕ L ( w− x )  − 1 − 2ϕ L ( w − x) ) 
 
Let li = 2ϕ L ( w − x ) w ere li>O for x0 wO   w) 
 
T  e term in t e parent esis is t en equal 
 
f ( li ) = e li   − 1 − li 
 
 
f li=O)=O  And 
 
f '( li ) = e li   − 1 > 0 for all li>O  Hence d  ( x) > 0 
dx 
T  erefore ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) > 0 
∂ϕ L 
 
~ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Prior Expected Value): 
T  e prior expected value increases due to q*8or VH 8 or VL 8 
First notice t at (I - e 2ϕ H ln I- δ) ) > O since nH>O and (I - e 2ϕ L ln I- δ) ) < O since nL<O 
 
T  e comparative statics are as follows 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
< 0 
dq * 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
< 0 
dV H 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
< 0 
dV L 
 
and 
and 
and 
d Pr ob( IPC ) > 0 
dq * 
 
d Pr ob( IPC ) 
> 0 
dV H 
 
d Pr ob( IPC ) 
> 0 
dV L 
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≤ ƒ ≤ ƒ 
H 
≤ ƒ ≤ ƒ 
H L 
e 
L 
H 
L 
Comparative statics wit   respect to q* 
 
 
 
dProb INC) -2ϕ H    2ϕ 
H 
≤ϒln I- q
*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L  )⁄ƒ 
 
dProb IPC) 
= 
2ϕ L e 2ϕ 
ϒ≤ln I- q
*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L  )⁄ƒ 
= 
dq* 
I - q*  )q* I - e2ϕ ln I- δ)  ) 
and dq* I - q*  )q*   I - e 2ϕ L ln I- δ)  ) 
 
 
 
Comparative statics wit   respect to VH 
 
 
 
dProb INC) 
= 
 
2ϕ H 2ϕ 
H ϒln I-q*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L  )⁄ 
e 
 
and dProb IPC) = 
 
2ϕ L e 2ϕ 
L ϒln I-q*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L  )⁄ 
dV L I - e2ϕ   ln I-δ)  )V L dV H I - e2ϕ 
Lln I-δ)  )V H 
 
 
 
Comparative statics wit   respect to VL 
 
 
 
dProb INC) =
 
 
2ϕ H 2ϕ 
H ϒln I- q*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L  )⁄ e 
 
dProb IPC) -2ϕ 
2ϕ L ϒln I-q*  )-lnq* +lnψ -lnV H +ln -V L  )⁄ e  
dV L 
 
I - e2ϕ   ln I-δ)  )V L 
and = 
dV L 
 
I - e2ϕ  ln I-δ)  )V L 
 
 
 
~ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 (Signal Quality): 
Step 1:  d Pr ob( INC ) >O w  en w 6w 
dψ O 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
dψ 
 
< 0 w  en wO is not to close to eit  er of t  e bounds 
 
w<<wO<< w 
 
 
Proof:   
i) d Pr ob( INC ) >O w  en w 6w 
dψ O 
_ 
H 2  H wO   is a function of q*  All ot  er terms, w_, w, : and  F ) in  2O) are invariant of q*  wO6 w is 
 
equivalent to ln q * 
1 − q * 
 
→ ln(−V 
 
L ) − ln(V H 
 
) + lnψ 
 
W  en wO6w t  e second term of 27) oes to liero T  e 
 
 
first term remains positive  Hence d Pr ob( INC ) > 0 
dψ 
 
w  en wO6w 
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H H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H H 
H 
H H 
H 
 
ii) d Pr ob( INC ) 
dψ 
 
< 0 w  en wO is not to close to eit  er of t  e bounds  w<<wO<< w 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
= 
  ∂ Pr ob( INC ) ∂w0    + 
  ∂ Pr ob( INC ) ∂ϕ   
dψ   ∂w
 
∂ψ    
 
∂ϕ H ∂ψ   
 
  0 
 
First examine 
      
 
∂ Pr ob( INC ) 
 
I - e2ϕ 
 
H     w- wO )  ϒ 2(w − w)e2ϕ 
H
 
 
w− w) 
 
2(w − w )e2ϕ 
 
w− w0 ) ⁄ 
= − ′ −  0  ∞ H H H H ∂ϕ I - e2ϕ w− w)   ′≤ 1 − e
2ϕ
 
w− w) 1 − e2ϕ w− w0 ) ∞ƒ 
 
 
Let 
 
( x) = 2(w − x)e 
2ϕ H    w − x ) 
w  ere x>w   Notice t  at x)<O for x>w and  d ( x) > 0 
1 − e2ϕ w− x ) dx 
 
1 1 Pick *=** suc   t  at w)= (w0 )
 T  en ϒ  (w) − (w0 ) ⁄ = − 
 (w0 ) > 0
 
 
 
For ** 
2 ≤ ƒ 2 
 
∂ Pr ob( INC ) 
 
I - e2ϕ 
 
w- wO )  ϒ (w − w  )e2ϕ 
 
w− w0 ) ⁄ 
=      ′  0  ∞ 
∂ϕ I - e2ϕ w− w)   ′≤ 1 − e
2ϕ
 
w− w0 ) ∞ƒ 
 
 
From Claim CI and C3 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) ♣♠ 2ϕ H 
e2ϕ 
( w− w0 )   ∂ϕ H    (w − w  )e2ϕ ( w− w0 ) ↔♠ 
=    +
   0   
ψ ♦ H
   ∂ψ    H ←
 
d
 ♠♥
ψ 
I - e2ϕ w − w ) )     I - e2ϕ w− w ) ) ♠↑ 
 
 
 
e2ϕ w- wO ) Let us now factor out  
  
> 0  We t  en   ave 
I - e2ϕ w− w ) ) 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) e2ϕ ( w− w0 ) ♣♠ 2ϕ 
H 
  ∂ϕ H    ↔♠ 
= 
dψ I - e2ϕ
 ♦ 
w− w ) ) ψ 
+   ∂ψ    
(w − w0 )← 
♠♥     ♠↑ 
 
∂ϕH T  e multiplicative term outside t  e parent  esis is positive Inside t  e parent  eses nH>0 and > 0 
∂ψ 
 
1 bY Clai
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m CI  BY pickin  q* we can  ave wO as bi  as we like and we can still maintain w)= 2 
 
(w0 ) 
 
for a bi   enou * Hence d Pr ob( INC ) < 0 
dψ 
for w<<wO<< w 
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L 
0 = −  
L 
L 
L 
~ 
 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( IPC ) d Pr ob( IPC ) Step 2: <O w  en wO6w >O w  en wO is not to close to eit  er of t  e bounds dψ dψ 
 
w<<wO<< w 
 
 
Proof:   
d Pr ob( IPC ) 
 
_ 
H 2  H i) 
dψ 
<O w  en wO6w wO  is a function of q*  All ot  er terms  w_, w, : and  F )  in 
 
2O) are invariant of q*  wO6w is equivalent to 
ln 
q * 
1 − q * 
 
→ ln(−V 
 
L ) − ln(V H 
 
) − ln(1 − δ ) + lnψ 
 
W  en wO6w t  e second term of  21)  oes to liero 
 
 
T  e first term of  21) remains ne  ative  Hence d Pr ob( IPC ) <O 
dψ 
 
 
 
ii) d Pr ob( IPC ) >O w  en w is not to close to eit  er of t  e bounds  w<<w << w 
dψ O O 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( IPC ) 
= 
  ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) ∂w0    + 
  ∂ Pr ob( IPC ) ∂ϕ    
dψ   ∂w
 
∂ψ    
 
∂ϕ L ∂ψ  
 
  0       
 
 
First examine 
 
 
∂ Pr ob( IPC ) I - e2ϕ 
L    w- wO )  ϒ 2(w − w)e2ϕ 
L
 w− w) 2(w − w )e2ϕ w− w0 ) ⁄ 
= ′ −  0  ∞ L L L L ∂ϕ I - e2ϕ w− w)   ′≤ 1 − e
2ϕ
 
w− w) 1 − e2ϕ w − w0 ) ∞ƒ 
 
 
 
2(w − x)e2ϕ w− x ) 
 
d  ( x) Let x)= w  ere x>w  notice t  at x)>O for x>w and > 0 
1 − e2ϕ w− x ) dx 
 
Pick *=** suc   t  at w)= 1 
 
(w0 )
 
 
T  en 
 
ϒ  (w) − (w ) ⁄ 1 
 
(w0 ) < 0
 
2 ≤ ƒ 2 
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0 
L 
L 
L 
L 
For ** 
 
∂ Pr ob( IPC ) 
 
I - e2ϕ 
 
w- wO ) ϒ (w − w )e2ϕ 
L 
 
w− w0 ) ⁄ 
=      ′   0  ∞ L L L ∂ϕ I - e2ϕ w− w)  ′≤ 1 − e
2ϕ
 
w− w0 ) ∞ƒ 
 
From Claim C2 and C4 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
=
 ♣♠
−
 
2ϕ L e2ϕ 
L ( w− w0 ) 
   + 
  δϕ L   ( w − w )e 2ϕ 
L ( w− w0 ) ↔♠ 
♦ L     L ← dψ
 ♠
♥ 
ψ I - e2ϕ w− w) )   δψ  
  
I - e2ϕ w− w) ) ♠↑ 
 
 
 
e2ϕ     w- wO ) Let us now factor out   We t  en   ave 
I - e2ϕ w− w) ) 
 
 
 
 
d Pr ob( INC ) 
=
 e2ϕ 
L ( w− w0 ) 
  
♣♠− 2ϕ
 
+ 
  δϕ L   
 ↔
♠ 
(w − w ) 
dψ I - e2ϕ 
L
 w− w) ) 
♦ ψ   δψ   0   ← ♥♠     ♠↑ 
 
 
 
 
T  e term outside t  e parent  esis is ne  ative  Inside t  e parent  eses ϕ L  < 0 
 
and δϕ 
L 
> 0 
 
BY pickin 
 
 
1 
q* we can  ave wO  as lar  e as we like and we can still maintain w)= 2 
 
d Pr ob( IPC ) 
 
 
 
(w0 ) 
δψ 
 
 
for a  i enou * 
Hence > 0 for w<<wO<< w dψ 
 
~ 
